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(CISA) passed by the Senate a few months earlier.' The enactment of this
legislation was, in many respects, a watershed moment, as it marked the
culmination of a four-plus year effort by bipartisan majorities in both Houses of
2Congress to legislate in this critical area. Indeed, CISA represents the first
major piece of cybersecurity legislation enacted into law that seeks to directly
address the relationship between the private and public sectors. Addressing this
relationship is particularly important for the United States government and, in
particular, its nascent efforts to protect the nation against serious threats in
cyberspace, principally because of the significant portion of the U.S. critical
infrastructure that is owned and operated by the private sector.3 Moreover,
because the legislation did not explicitly seek to regulate private actors, the
legislation likewise represented a major win for industry, having successfully
pushed back against early efforts by the Obama Administration and key players
in the Senate to impose significant regulatory requirements upon certain critical
infrastructure entities in the private sector.4
Thus, it is unsurprising when, around the passage and enactment of CISA,
there was much self-congratulation and numerous laudatory statements were
made on Capitol Hill. And while, to be sure, there is much cause for celebration
in the enactment of this legislation-given that it provides new, clear authorities
for cybersecurity threat collection and sharing and the use and sharing of certain
types of defensive measures, as well as useful liability protection for such
1. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2015, P.L. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 ("CISA");
see also Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. (as passedby the
Senate on Oct. 27, 2015).
2. See Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523, 112th Cong. (introduced
on Nov. 30, 2011) ("CISPA").
3. See, e.g., Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, INFORMATION SHARING
ENVIRONMENT, https://www.ise.gov/mission-partners/critical-infrastructure-and-key-resources (la t
visited July 2, 2016) ("The private sector owns and operates an estimated 85% of infra-structure and
resources critical to our Nation's physical and economic security. It is, therefore, vital to ensure we
develop effective and efficient information sharing partnerships with private sector entities."); see
also, e.g., CHRIS BRONK, CYBER THREAT: THE RISE OF INFORMATION GEOPOLITICS IN U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY 63 (Praeger 2016) ("Because so much of the U.S. critical infrastructure is
operated by entities within the private sector, the figure of 85% is commonly cited, the process of
securing that infrastructure from cyber attack is inherently [a] public-private process.").
4. Compare, e.g., CISA P.L. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242; The White House Office of the Press
Secretary, Securing Cyberspace- President Obama Announces New Cybersecurity Legislative
Proposal and Other Cybersecurity Efforts, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 13, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/13/securing-cyberspace-president-obama-
announces-new-cybersecurity-legislat; with The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact
Sheet: Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 12, 2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 11/052/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-legislative-
proposal; see also, Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012).
5. Cory Bennett & Katie Bo Williams, Senate Passes First Major Cyber Bill in Years, THE
HILL (Oct. 27, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/258260-senate-passes-first-major-
cyber-bill-in-years; Cory Bennett, Congress Approves First Major Cyber Bill in Years, THE HILL
(Dec. 15, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/263696-congress-approves-first-major-
cyber-bill-in-years.
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activities when conducted consistent with the new law-one needs wonder why,
if this legislation was so critically important, the private sector response was
relatively muted.
The answer, unfortunately, lies in the text of the legislation itself and the
compromises made in order to get the legislation out of Congress and onto the
President's desk for signature. Key provisions of the enacted law were
significantly modified from the original text passed by the House in 2012 when
significant bipartisan majorities voted in favor of the bill in the face of a White
House veto threat. For better or for worse, there is a reasonable argument to be
made that while the bill provides very helpful authorities for the private sector, it
may nonetheless result in very little new cybersecurity threat sharing, at least as
between the private sector and the government. This Article will briefly lay out
some of the key provisions of CISA as enacted, highlighting the important
benefits for the private sector in the legislation and the strong opportunities it
provides for enhanced cybersecurity defensive activities by industry and
expanded threat sharing, particularly private-to-private sharing. The Article will
also identify key flaws in the legislation and will conclude with a brief set of
recommendations for Congress to consider as it continues to examine the
intersection between public and private sector cybersecurity efforts.
II. CORE CISA AUTHORITIES FOR DETECTING AND MITIGATING
CYBERSECURITY THREATS
Perhaps the most obvious group of benefits provided by CISA are the clear,
positive grant of authorities it provides for private sector cybersecurity threat
monitoring and use of defensive measures.
First, CISA provides a specific, but broad grant of authority to private sector
entities to conduct monitoring, for cybersecurity purposes, of their own systems
and the systems of customers that provide authorization and written consent for
such monitoring.6 This authority permits a private sector entity to conduct fairly
comprehensive cybersecurity monitoring efforts on its own information systems
and those of its authorized customers, including, most importantly, information
stored on, processed by, or transiting such systems. The latter provision,
permitting the monitoring of information transiting a given private sector actor's
information system, is particularly important for Layer 1 providers, who can use
6. See CISA, P.L. 114-113, § 104(a)(1), 129 Stat. 2242 (2015). ("(a) Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, a private entity may, for cybersecurity purposes, monitor A) an
information system of such private entity; (B) an information system of another non-Federal entity,
upon the authorization and written consent of such other entity; . . . and (D) information that is
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this authority to protect their systems and those of their consenting customers
from threats neither originating nor destined for the provider's own systems.8
Second, CISA provides a significantly large carrot to incentivize private
entities for conducting such monitoring in the form of specific liability
protection for such activities.9
Third, CISA provides a specific (and similarly broad) grant of authority to
private sector entities to operate defensive measures on their own systems, as
well as on the systems of their customers that provide appropriate authorization
and written consent for the operation of such measures.'0
These provisions, at least as to monitoring, are similar to the language
contained in the original House-passed CISPA bill." Indeed, with the addition
of the defensive measures authority, CISA is stronger than the original CISPA
legislation on these positive authorities. These provisions, taken together, can be
read to significantly enhance the ability of corporate Chief Information Officers
(CIOs), Chief Security Officers (CSOs), and Chief Information Security Officers
(CISOs) to conduct their network defense activities with less concern about legal
challenges (at least within certain clearly delineated bounds as provided in the
bill). In essence, these positive authorities serve to get the lawyers out of the
room at least once the determination has been made that the proposed activities
and purposes meet the definitions in CISA-allowing the cybersecurity
professionals to do their job.
8. See, e.g., H.R. Rept. No. 112-45 (accompanying H.R. 3523) (2011) 11,
https://www.congress.gov/ 112/crpt/hrpt445/CRPT- 1 12hrpt445.pdf ("CISPA Committee Report")
("In this context, it is the Committee's intent that the protection of the rights and property of a
corporate entity includes, but is not limited to, the protection of the systems and networks that make
up its own corporate internal and external information systems but also the systems and networks
over which it provides services to its customers. For example, the Committee expects that an
internet service provider or telecommunications company may seek to protect not only its own
corporate networks but also the backbone communications systems and networks over which it
provides services to its customers.") (discussing related language in the original Cyber Intelligence
Sharing and Protection Act).
9. See id. at § 106(a), 2950-51 ("No cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court
against any private entity, and such action shall be promptly dismissed, for the monitoring of an
information system and information under section 104(a) that is conducted in accordance with this
title.")
10. See id. at § 104(b)(1), 2941 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a private entity
may, for cybersecurity purposes, operate a defensive measure that is applied to A) an information
system of such private entity in order to protect the rights or property of the private entity; [and] (B)
an information system of another non-Federal entity upon written consent of such entity for
operation of such defensive measure to protect the rights or property of such entity.").
11. See CISPA H.R. 3523 112th Cong. § 1104(b)(1) (2011) ("Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a cybersecurity provider, with the express consent of a protected entity for which
such cybersecurity provider is providing goods or services for cybersecurity purposes, may, for
cybersecurity purposes- (i) use cybersecurity systems to identify and obtain cyber threat information
to protect the rights and property of such protected entity; and (ii) share such cyber threat
information with any other entity designated by such protected entity.")
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Undoubtedly, any prudent CIO, CSO, or CISO will still consult in-house or
outside counsel for guidance as needed, but barring significant changes in the
law or its interpretation by the courts, these provisions in CISA ought make such
monitoring and use of defensive measures by the private sector significantly
easier and more efficient, principally because the new law puts these activities on
firm legal footing pursuant to positive authority that is explicitly carved out from
other potentially applicable laws.
III. CORE CISA AUTHORITIES FOR INFORMATION SHARING
CISA also provides a fairly broad grant of authority to private sector entities
in order to enhance information sharing. Specifically, CISA provides a general
authority to private sector entities to share cyber threat indicators and defensive
measures with one another for cybersecurity purposes (and with the federal
government, as discussed infra) and to use such shared threat indicators and
defensive measures for cybersecurity purposes, so long as the sharing and use
complies with any lawful restrictions imposed by the entity providing them (and,
in the case of use, retention, and further sharing by a receiving entity, any
restriction imposed by law).12 This broad sharing authority-like the monitoring
authority-also comes with a carrot: private sector entities sharing with other
private sector entities under the aegis of CISA are entitled to liability protection
for such sharing. 13
There are three critical caveats to this broad sharing authority and its
accompanying carrot of liability protection, however. The first caveat-the
minimization requirement will be discussed in this section because it relates
both to sharing with the government and within the private sector, while the
second caveat the single path into government-will be discussed in the
context of private-to-government sharing,14 and the third caveat-the limitations
12. See CISA § 104(c)(1) ("Except as provided in paragraph (2) and notwithstanding any
other provision of law, a non-Federal entity may, for a cybersecurity purpose and consistent with
the protection of classified information, share with, or receive from, any other non-Federal entity or
the Federal Government a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure."); see id. § 104(c)(2) ("A
non-Federal entity receiving a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure from another non-Federal
entity or a Federal entity shall comply with otherwise lawful restrictions placed on the sharing or
use of such cyber threat indicator or defensive measure by the sharing non-Federal entity or Federal
entity."); see also id § 104(d)(3) ("Consistent with this title, a cyber threat indicator or defensive
measure shared or received under this section may, for cybersecurity purposes ... be used by a non-
Federal entity to monitor or operate a defensive measure ... and [] be otherwise used, retained, and
further shared by a non-Federal entity subject to ... an otherwise lawful restriction placed by the
sharing non-Federal entity or Federal entity on such cyber threat indicator or defensive measure[]or
[]an otherwise applicable provision of law.")
13. See id. at § 106(b)-(b)(1) ("No cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court
against any private entity, and such action shall be promptly dismissed, for the sharing or receipt of
a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure under section 104(c) if . .. such sharing or receipt is
conducted in accordance with this title[.]").
14. See infra Part IV.
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on liability protection-will be discussed in the context of private-to-private
sharing because of its likely impact (or lack thereof) on the incentives for such
sharing.'5
First, CISA requires private sector entities, prior to sharing any cyber threat
indicators, to review such indicators in order to assess whether they contain any
information known to be a specific individual's personal or identifying
information that is not directly related to a cybersecurity threat.16 If such
information is found, it must be removed prior to sharing.'7 Alternatively, the
legislation permits a private sector entity to utilize technical capabilities
configured to remove such information. 8
This provision while not as onerous as earlier versions-could have a
significant limiting effect on both private-to-private sharing as well as private-to-
government sharing because it essentially requires private sector entities to
conduct a form of minimization-as the government does when it collects
communications content. That is, it imposes upon the private sector for the
sharing of cybersecurity threat information-not communications content-a
requirement hat is typically imposed upon the government only when it captures
the substance and purport of a communication. In the typical law enforcement
context, minimization is handled at the time of collection when the individual
conducting the wiretap make the decision whether an ongoing conversation is
relevant to the investigation.19 In other contexts, like foreign intelligence
surveillance, minimization is conducted pursuant to specific guidelines and
20employs the use of redactions and the like. Indeed, the imposition of
minimization on the government is a heavy burden, typically required in order to
protect the privacy of individual communicants. To impose such a burden on the
15. See infra Part V.
16. See CISA § 104(d)(2) ("A non-Federal entity sharing a cyber threat indicator pursuant to
this title shall, prior to such sharing (A) review such cyber threat indicator to assess whether such
cyber threat indicator contains any information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat that the
non-Federal entity knows at the time of sharing to be personal information of a specific individual
or information that identifies a specific individual and remove such information.").
17. See id.
18. See id. at § 104(d)(2)(A)-(B) ("... [O]r (B) implement and utilize a technical capability
configured to remove any information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat that the non-
Federal entity knows at the time of sharing to be personal information of a specific individual or
information that identifies a specific individual.").
19. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 527 F.3d 891, 904-07 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing
certain criminal minimization procedures).
20. See, e.g., NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
OF 1978, AS AMENDED 12, (declassified), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0928/2014%/20NSA
%20702%20Minimization%20Procedures.pdf ("A dissemination based on communications of or
concerning a United States person may be made in accordance with Section 7 or 8 below if the
identity of the United States person is deleted and a generic term or symbol is substituted so that the
information cannot reasonably be connected with an identifiable United States person.")
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private sector, particularly in the context of a threat sharing mechanism where
concerns about private communications are fairly limited, is to put a significant
barrier in the path of robust information sharing for limited privacy benefits.
To be sure, the minimization requirement in CISA is somewhat limited: all
that companies are required to look for and remove is information not directly
related to a cybersecurity threat that the sharing party knows at the time of
sharing to be personal information a specific individual or identifies such
individual.21 Nonetheless, imposing a minimization-like requirement, somewhat
narrow though it might be, will likely make companies less likely to share in the
first instance, at least until the market develops CISA-compliant sharing systems
or mechanisms that employ a technical capability along the lines authorized by
statute. Indeed, given the fact that the entire CISA regime is voluntary and the
government is ostensibly seeking to incentivize private actors to share both with
the government and one another to improve the collective defense posture of the
nation and key private sector entities, particularly in the critical infrastructure
area,22 it is an odd (and potentially counterproductive) move to impose a costly
requirement on voluntary actors. It is also worth noting that the imposition of
such a minimization requirement on a private sector actor-much less one who
you hope to incent into sharing-is unprecedented. For example, in every
surveillance context that the author is aware of, it is the government, not the
private party that is responsible for minimization in the first instance. This is
true even in the most privacy-sensitive case where the government is
affirmatively collecting communications content for the specific purpose of
reviewing the content pursuant to appropriate legal authority; in that scenario,
the provider gives the government access to the full content of communications
and it is the government that is responsible for applying the relevant
minimization process.
IV. SHARING WITH THE GOVERNMENT
As noted above, CISA's broad sharing provisions also apply to the
government, in that they authorize private sector entities to share cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures with the government.23 And in the opposite
direction (i.e., govemment-to-private), CISA actually requires the government to
develop procedures to facilitate and promote the sharing of both classified and
21. See CISA § 104(d)(2).
22. See, e.g., Protecting America's Cyber Networks Coal., Cybersecurity Information-
Sharing Legislation: 'Voluntary'Means Voluntary Separating Fact from Fiction, U.S. CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE WEBSITE (August 26, 2015), https://www.uschamber.com/file/cisa-voluntary-
separating-fact-fictionpdf (describing how the voluntary nature of CISA's provisions are essential to
its legislative purposes).
23. See CISA § 104(c)(1).
2016] 591
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unclassified cyber threat information with the private sector.24 The Department
of Homeland Security is charged with creating the capability to receive cyber
threat indicators and defensive measures in real time from the private sector
25within ninety days of enactment of the legislation. While on their face these
provisions ought to create the basis for a strong information sharing relationship
between the private sector and the government, again, key provisions of CISA
serve to limit the usefulness of these authorities.
And this leads us to the second major caveat to broad sharing authority and
liability protection for sharing mentioned above. When it comes to sharing with
the government, CISA is very clear that private sector entities may share with
whomever they want in the federal government and that there are no sharing
26mandates. Indeed, the bill as enacted contains specific language making clear
that nothing in the legislation may be construed to "limit or modify an existing
information sharing relationship[,] to prohibit a new information sharing
relationship[,] to require a new information sharing relationship between any
non-Federal entity and a Federal entity or another non-Federal entity[,] or to
require the use of the [real-time] capability and process within the Department of
Homeland Security."27 At the same time, though, the part of the legislation that
requires DHS to create a real-time receipt capability makes clear that once the
Secretary of DHS certifies that this real time process operates fully and
effectively, the DHS system "shall ... be the process by which the Federal
Government receives cyber threat indicators and defensive measures . . . shared
by a private entity with the Federal Government...."28 And while this provision
has an exception for "communications between a Federal entity and a non-
Federal entity regarding a previously shared cyber threat indicator
[and] ... communications by a regulated non-Federal entity with such entity's
Federal regulatory authority regarding a cybersecurity threat," these fairly minor
exceptions principally serve to underline the central role that CISA envisions for
24. See id. at § 103(a)-(a)(1) ("Consistent with the protection of classified information,
intelligence sources and methods, and privacy and civil liberties, the Director of National
Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney
General, in consultation with the heads of the appropriate Federal entities, shall jointly develop and
procedures to facilitate and promote I) the timely sharing of classified cyber threat indicators and
defensive measures in the possession of the Federal Government with representatives of relevant
Federal entities and non-Federal entities that have appropriate security clearances[.]").
25. See id. at § 105(c)(1)-(1)(A) ("Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of the appropriate
Federal entities, shall develop and implement a capability and process within the Department of
Homeland Security that (A) shall accept from any non-Federal entity in real time cyber threat
indicators and defensive measures, pursuant to this section[.]").
26. See, e.g., id. at § 108(f)(1)-(4); id. at § 108(i) ("Nothing in this title shall be construed to
subject any entity to liability for choosing not to engage in the voluntary activities authorized in this
title.").
27. Id. at § 108(f)(1)-(4).
28. Id. at § 105(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
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DHS.29 Namely, CISA explicitly highlights the key compromise made to get the
bills to the President's desk: that DHS is to be the central receiving point for all
private sector shared threat information for the federal government. This feature
of the legislation is underlined by the fact that CISA further provides that in
order to take advantage of the bill's key carrot for information sharing with the
federal government-liability protection private sector entities must share
cyber threat information with the government through the real-time process
created by DHS.30 And while CISA provides the potential for relief by
permitting the President to designate other agencies to receive information,3' the
limitations imposed on this authority (namely that perhaps the most capable
agency available to deal with such information, the National Security Agency, is
explicitly barred from receiving such information in the first instance), the
conditions required for the use of this authority (that the President find such
additional designation is necessary to receive threat information), and the odds it
will be actually employed (particularly given the White House's insistence on
this provision) all make this carve-out fairly cold comfort for those looking for
options.
Requiring all private sector entities to go only through the DHS portal could
result in significant reduction in uptake by industry of the voluntary information
process for a variety of reasons. First, DHS is generally seen as facing major
challenges in capability in the cyber area32 and a number of other agencies, from
DOD/NSA to FBI, are seen by industry as more capable, reliable, or secure33
29. Id. at § 105(c)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
30. See id. at § 106(b)-(b)(2) ("No cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court
against any private entity, and such action shall be promptly dismissed, for the sharing or receipt of
a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure under section 104(c) if--(1) such sharing or receipt is
conducted in accordance with this title; and (2) in a case in which a cyber threat indicator or
defensive measure is shared in a manner that is consistent with section 105(c)(1)(B) . . . ").
31. See id. at § 105(c)(2)(B)-(B)(I) ("[T]he President may designate an appropriate Federal
entity, other than the Department of Defense (including the National Security Agency), to develop
and implement a capability and process as described in paragraph (1).. if, not fewer than 30 days
before making such designation, the President submits to Congress a certification and explanation
that (I) such designation is necessary to ensure that full, effective, and secure operation of a
capability and process for the Federal Government to receive from any non-Federal entity cyber
threat indicators or defensive measures under this title . . . .")
32. See, e.g., GAO-16-294, DHS NEEDS TO ENHANCE CAPABILITIES, IMPROVE
PLANNING, AND SUPPORT GREATER ADOPTION OF ITS NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY
PROTECTION SYSTEM (2016), 16-25 (describing challenges in DHS's core cybersecurity
defensive system for the federal government); Daniel Wilson, DHS Needs To Improve
Cybersecurity Efforts, Watchdog Says, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.law360.com/
articles/702887/dhs-needs-to-improve-cybersecurity-efforts-watchdog-says.
33. William Jackson, MeCain Slams DHS, wants DOD to Defend Cyberspace, GCN (Mar 27,
2012), https://gcn.com/Articles/2012/03/27/Cyber-defense-hearing-McCain-slams-DHS-favors-
DOD.aspx; Susan Hennessey, CISA in Context: The Voluntary Sharing Model and that "Other"
Portal, LAWFARE (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cisa-context-voluntary-sharing-
model-and-other-portal ("First, let's air a bit of widely-known governmental dirty laundry. There
are members of the executive branch and Congress who oppose a DHS-lead information sharing
9
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and, in some cases, are actively working to reach out to the private sector to be
the primary government agency that industry calls in the event of a cyber
incident.34
Perhaps more importantly, DHS's broad regulatory mandate and role in
ensuring critical infrastructure identification, protection, and-ostensibly-
regulation, has many industry participants quite reasonably concerned about
sharing cyber threats with the very agency that is at the forefront of a larger
regulatory movement. And CISA does little to ameliorate such concerns. While
the legislation explicitly states that "cyber threat indicators and defensive
measures provided to the Federal Government under this title shall not be used
... to regulate ... the lawful activities of any non-Federal entity or any
activities taken by a non-Federal entity pursuant o mandatory standards"35 it
also provides a major exception that raises at least the same amount of regulatory
36questions and concerns that the general provision seeks to resolve. The
exception specifically provides that "[c]yber threat indicators and defensive
measures provided to the Federal Government under this title may, consistent
with Federal or State regulatory authority specifically relating to the prevention
or mitigation of cybersecurity threats to information systems, inform the
development or implementation of regulations relating to such information
systems."37
The upshot of this regulatory back-and-forth appears to be that while the
government may not directly regulate an entity based on its disclosure of a
portal. For complex reasons involving cultural values, agency evolution, historical performance,
and mission sets, there are factions across the government that simply do not trust DHS to get the
job done. As I discussed in my previous post, despite the unanimous consent provision, DHS holds
a trump card over other federal agencies in that it can elect to not ingest particular information to the
portal by setting STIX TAXII fields. In the unlikely event DHS and the rest of the designated
federal entities simply cannot agree, CISA permits the President to set up an alternative path and
presumably allow private entities to choose where to share. The provision offers skeptics of DHS-
both those who accuse it of plain incompetence and those who fear the agency is "all privacy, no
mission" a presidentially-controlled escape value. If, for whatever reason, DHS is unable to fully,
effectively, and securely operate the portal, the President can give the job to someone else.").
34. Compare, e.g., DHS, Information Sharing, available online at https://www.dhs.gov/
topic/cybersecurity-information-sharing ("The Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration
Program (CISCP) is DHS's flagship program for public-private information sharing. In CISCP,
DHS and participating companies share information about cyber threats, incidents, and
vulnerabilities. Information shared via CISCP allows all participants to better secure their own
networks and helps support the shared security of CISCP partners. Further, CISCP provides a
collaborative environment where analysts learn from each other to better understand emerging
cybersecurity risks and effective defenses.") with, e.g., INFRAGARD, https://www.infragard.org/node
("InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI and the private sector. It is an association of persons
who represent businesses, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies, and other
participants dedicated to sharing information and intelligence to prevent hostile acts against the
U.S.").
35. CISA § 105(d)(5)(D)(i).
36. See id. at § 105(d)(5)(D)(ii)(I).
37. Id. (emphasis added).
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particular cyber threat indicator or defensive measure, a federal or state
department or agency (or independent agency) may nonetheless-assuming it
has the requisite regulatory authority-use the shared information to inform and
develop broader cybersecurity regulations that apply to a class of entities that
may or may not include the specific entity that originally shared the information.
If this reading of the compromise is accurate, it strongly suggests that those
chary about sharing information with the federal government generally, and
DHS in particular, because of the specter of coming cybersecurity regulation
have more than a reasonable basis for concern.
Thus, while the bill suggests the federal government might consider creating
alternate sharing mechanisms,38 and makes clear that CISA, in and of itself, does
not authorize new regulations,39 the explicit nod to the use of shared information
for potential regulatory ends remains a major cause for concern and a likely
reason that information sharing with the government may not nearly as broad or
deep as supporters of CISA might hope or expect.
V. SHARING AMONGST PRIVATE SECTOR ENTITIES
While CISA provides strong authorities and some incentives for sharing
amongst private sector entities as noted above, including liability protection for
the act of sharing, more could be done to further incentivize private sector
sharing. For example, in moving from CISPA to CISA, legislators abandoned a
key aspect of the original legislation's liability protection provision: that not only
would private sector entities sharing information be protected from liability for
the act of sharing itself, but that they would likewise be protected from actions
taken-or not taken-on the basis of information received from others sharing
under the legislation's provisions.40 That is, subject to certain critical caveats
38. See id. § 105(c)(2)(B).
39. See id. at § 108(1) ("Nothing in this title shall be construed (1) to authorize the
promulgation of any regulations not specifically authorized to be issued under this title; (2) to
establish or limit any regulatory authority not specifically established or limited under this title; or
(3) to authorize regulatory actions that would duplicate or conflict with regulatory requirements,
mandatory standards, or related processes under another provision of Federal law.").
40. See CISPA H.R. 3523 112th Cong. § 1104(b)(4)-(4)(B) ("No civil or criminal cause of
action shall lie or be maintained in Federal or State court against a protected entity, self-protected
entity, [or] cybersecurity provider ... acting in good faith ... (B) for decisions made based on
cyber threat information identified, obtained, or shared under this section."); see also CISPA
Committee Report, H. Rept. 112-445 at 13-14 ("The Committee's intent is likewise to provide
strong liability protection to entities when they engage in robust cyber threat information sharing so
that they are not held liable for not acting on every piece of cyber threat intelligence provided by the
government or every piece of cyber threat information that they detect or receive from another
private sector entity. The Committee believes that if information sharing does become truly robust,
the amount of cyber threat information and the speed with which such information will be shared
will make it nearly impossible to always protect against every threat in real-time and, as such,
private sector entities ought not be held liable for such actions. Similarly, the Committee
recognizes that particular entities may engage in a cost-benefit analysis with respect to
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designed to address potential moral hazard issues associated with such broad
liability protection, including exceptions preserving existing liability rules for
activities undertaken in bad faith,4' CISPA provided a major carrot to industry to
incentivize sharing that was simply left out of the final CISA language.
Such incentives may be critical to the broad uptake of information sharing
amongst industry participants for a range of reasons. First, while it is true that
key industry groups-like the financial services and energy sectors-have made
major progress on cyber threat sharing even in the absence of significant federal
incentives (indeed, industry organizations such as the FS-ISAC and the E-ISAC
are role models for threat sharing), such sharing is likely to be the exception and
not the rule. Both of these industries-potentially unlike others have built-in
structural and economic incentives or lack typical barriers that, in combination,
make them more likely to share critical threat information. For example, given
the highly integrated and interreliant nature of key financial institutions,
particularly at the top level with major custodian banks and central security
depositories, the systemic nature of the threat to the entire system can create a
strong internal incentive for undertaking collective defense measures, including
robust threat sharing. Similarly, the remnants of the highly regulated,
segmented, and regionalized structure of the electric industry likewise removes
some of the competitive pressures that might otherwise inhibit cooperative
measures like threat sharing. Other industries, however, may lack some of these
inherent incentives or still face competitive issues that could limit robust
cooperation. For such highly competitive industries, where a risk to one or two
major entities may not create a systemic risk for other players, additional
incentives may be necessary. And given the structure of U.S. industry, it is
likely that such industries are the norm, not the exception.
As such, CISA's lack of the additional carrot of expanded liability protection
offered by CISPA may likewise mean that CISA-while a step in the right
direction given the strong authorizing language-may still lack sufficient
incentives to encourage even truly robust private-to-private sharing, at least in
industries where sufficient incentives are already lacking or where competitive
barriers to sharing remain in place.
implementing protections against particular threats and the Committee intends this provision to help
ensure that a private sector entity making such a judgment not be held liable for making such
reasonable determinations.").
41. See id. CISPA at § 1 104(b)(4) (requiring a provider or other protected entity to "act[] in
good faith" in order to obtain liability protection under CISPA); see also id. CISPA Committee
Report at 14 ("At the same time, the Committee was fully cognizant of the concern that it not create
a moral hazard by providing too broad a liability protection provision and that it not incentivize bad
acts. As a result, Paragraph (3) requires that the entity be acting in good faith to obtain the benefits
of this liability protection. That is, where an entity acts in bad faith, it does not receive the benefit
of the strong liability protection provided by the legislation.").
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VI. OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONGRESS TO ADDRESS CISA's KEY FLAWS
If in fact this Article is correct and both private-to-private and, more likely,
private-to-government sharing is slower to take off under CISA than expected,
there are a few potential quick fixes that could be put in place, should Congress
see fit to do so.
First, Congress could easily shift the heavy burden of minimization away
from private actors to government recipients, as it does in the classic-and
significantly more intrusive-content surveillance context. While this would
have the benefit of removing a significant economic and practical barrier to
information sharing, it would, admittedly have the downside of not addressing
the sharing of personally identifiable information as between private sector
actors. In many ways, however, this is an issue that exists even outside the
cybersecurity context. With few exceptions, companies like Google, Apple,
Microsoft and others, with consent from the individual, regularly collect and
share personally identifiable information about their customers, typically
consistent with their contractual and licensing provisions and their applicable
privacy policies. As such, returning to the status quo ante with respect to
private-to-private sharing, while retaining a private-to-government minimization
requirement but shifted to the government would have the benefit of taking the
pressure off industry while still getting the bulk of the ostensible privacy benefit
sought by advocates.
Second, Congress could simply bar the use of any information shared by the
private sector for any regulatory purposes-general or otherwise-and remove
yet another major economic and psychological barrier limiting industry's sharing
with the government.
Third, Congress could work with the President o encourage him to certify
additional routes into the government, including providing liability protection for
them, or could simply legislate this itself (and potentially opening up the space to
some of the most capable actors in government). In either event, freeing
industry up from solely working through DHS may be a win for both industry
and the government, given its own challenges and the practical reality associated
with DHS's apparent regulatory interests in the critical infrastructure space.
Finally, Congress could expand the liability protection offered for cyber
threat information sharing beyond just the act of sharing itself to the decisions
made by companies in receipt of shared information. Such an expansion,
appropriately crafted to avoid potential moral hazard issues, would serve to
further incentivize both robust private-to-private sharing, as well as ingest and
utilization of government-to-private shared information.
VII. CONCLUSION
On balance, the enactment of CISA is a strong step in the right direction for
both private industry and the government. Nonetheless, as is often the case with
the legislative process, the compromises made to get to a bill that could pass
2016] 597
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both chambers and be signed into law have clearly resulted in a less-than optimal
bill, at least with respect to its core goal of encouraging and empowering broad-
based cybersecurity information sharing between the private sector and the
government. As such, things remain to be done and, should Congress find itself
with an opportunity to make additional changes, there are at least a handful of
options that, with some artful drafting, could provide a significant impact to
further incentivize and promote cyber threat information sharing both within
private industry as well as with the government.
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